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ABSTRACT 
Purpose: This paper examines if gender diversity on corporate boards promotes corporate social 
performance across industries and across countries. 
Methodology: Fixed-effect panel models are estimated using European-wide data from 2002 
through 2013. Instrumental variable estimation and propensity score matching are also employed 
to control for potential endogeneity. 
Findings: Board gender diversity improves environmental and social performance, and 
consequently the corporate social performance. Although the positive effect of gender diversity is 
prevalent across industries, the effect is more pronounced for firms in emerging markets. 
Regulatory implications: The findings suggest that gender law that fosters gender diversity can 
promote corporate social performance in firms and the benefit can be enjoyed with just an 
introduction of one female director to the board. Promotion of gender diversity in Europe is 
most beneficial in emerging markets. 
Originality: The results provide new insights to the literature as we find that a critical mass of 
female directors on boards is not required to promote corporate social performance. The 
research also highlights that board gender diversity enhances corporate social performance 
irrespective of the industry and the effect on corporate social performance is more pronounced 
in emerging markets where regulations regarding CSR are not so clear-cut. 
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models, propensity score matching 
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One of the European Union’s founding values is to foster equality between women and men by 
promoting equal opportunities in corporate board representation and decision making. Countries 
such as Norway, Italy and Spain have already enforced legislations to promote female 
representation in the boardrooms, while other countries such as the UK have issued strong 
recommendations to increase female representation on the male-dominated boardroom. 
In the meantime, societal goals are appearing alongside economic goals (Carroll, 2000) and 
corporations are expected to exhibit environmental ethics and social ethics while maximizing 
shareholders’ wealth. We bring together these emerging themes by studying if board gender 
diversity (BGD) promotes corporate social performance (CSP). 
Resource dependence theory explains that firm performance is dependent upon the 
resourcefulness of the corporation at the board level. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) describe a 
corporate board as the source of critical resources for a firm in terms of advice, counsel and 
addressing pressures from stakeholders. The board’s ability to provide critical resources to the 
corporation that can enrich the strategic decision-making practice depends on the collective 
experience and expertise of the board members (Bear et al., 2010; Post et al., 2015). Since female 
directors have different perspectives to CSP than male directors (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002) 
BGD may enrich the board and broaden boardroom discussions and perspectives, and 
consequently CSP. Our results show that an increase in BGD improves both environmental and 
social performance, resulting in an improvement in the aggregate performance. 
We also examine if the effect of BGD on CSP varies across countries. Resource dependence 
theory together with neo institutional theory provides a platform for the investigation. Matten 
and Moon (2008) show that European countries have a relatively implicit institutional framework 
towards CSP. This means that individual corporations do not normally articulate their own 
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versions of social responsibilities. Meanwhile, increasing socially responsible investments and new 
market indexes focusing on companies’ social and environmental performance such as 
FTSE4Good index are demanding CSP in companies. As a result, what is considered to be 
acceptable and legitimate CSP is changing at the institutional level, albeit more so in some 
countries than in others. Consistent with the expectations, we find that the effect of BGD on 
CSP is stronger in emerging (financial) markets where a relatively informal framework still 
prevails. 
Moreover, companies in industries that are perceived as high environmental/social risk face 
pressures from various stakeholders to be active in CSP. Therefore, we examine the effect of 
BGD across industries where firms are classified as operating in industries with high (low) 
impacts on stakeholders. We find that BGD improves CSP in both high and low impact 
industries. 
Endogeneity is a potential problem in studies examining the relationship between BGD and CSP, 
and without carefully controlling for endogeneity the results can lead to misleading inferences.1 
Therefore, we employ instrumental variable estimations to address this issue. 
Finally, since CSR is a multi-faceted concept (Walls et al., 2012), we examine the effect of BGD 
on the individual facets, environmental and social performances, as well as the aggregate 
performance using a large sample of 754 firms from 20 European countries. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the review of literature, section 
3 covers the data and methodology, in section 4 the results are explained and section 5 provides 
evidence from robustness checks. The paper ends in section 6 with discussions and conclusions. 
 
2. Literature and hypotheses 
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Behavioral studies have documented that females tend to hold attitudes, beliefs, values and 
perspectives different from their male counterparts (Pelled et al., 1999). Female directors in 
business tend to exhibit more risk aversion in their business decisions and less likelihood to flout 
accounting, financial or ethical rules and regulations than their male counterparts (Pierce and 
Sweeney, 2010; Kyaw et al., 2015). Moreover, studies have found that increased female 
representation on the boards has been associated with an increase in the level of charitable 
givings (Bernadi and Threadgill, 2010), improved connections with the community (Hillman et al., 
2002), enhanced organizational practices relating to CSR (Zhang, 2012) and, in particular, 
environmental performance (Rao et al., 2012) and restraint of disreputable practices such as 
pollution (Bear et al., 2010). Landry et al. (2016) find that Fortune 500 companies that have a 
higher female representation on the board are more likely to appear on the list of World’s Most 
Ethical Company. On the other hand, Deschênes et al. (2015) explain that if BGD were to 
present the firm in a positive light while overshadowing firm’s bad environmental practices e.g. 
pollution, the presence of women on the board may not necessarily lead to improvement in 
environmental practices. In faith that firms adopt CSP to address environmental and social 
issues, we develop the following hypotheses. 
H1a - BGD improves environmental performance (ENP) of a firm. 
H1b - BGD improves social performance (SOP) of a firm. 
H1c - BGD improves CSP of a firm. 
Neo-institutional theory postulates that organizations adopt institutionalized forms of behavior 
to enhance their internal and external legitimacy (Scott, 1995). Corporations make decisions 
within a broader social context. This may, for example, be done by benchmarking against 
prevailing norms or existing practices thereby making a corporation being on par with 
competitors, in conformity with regulators and responding to the normative understandings of 
stakeholder groups (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). 
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Corporations are subject to the institutional context at two levels: country level and industry level. 
At country level, according to institutional theory, corporations can be viewed as embedded in a 
nexus of formal and informal framework. The implicit institutional framework widely accepted in 
Europe enables corporations to enact CSR policies, programs and practices without explicit 
articulations (Matten and Moon, 2008). However, in the European countries that have developed 
their financial markets, companies also face new norms and incentives. With rising socially 
responsible investments and market indexes focusing on firm environmental and social 
performances such as FTSE4Good index, a growing number of companies in developed markets 
strive to include CSP as a corporate goal with social performance indicators explicitly articulated 
(Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010). Chih et al. (2008) report that while a high proportion of firms 
in the developed markets are included in the FTSE4Good Global Index2, only a very few 
proportion of firms from the emerging markets are in the index. Thus, outside of the developed 
markets where the institutional context does not give more incentive and opportunity for 
corporations to take explicit responsibility, it is expected that gender diversity will have a more 
positive impact on CSP. Accordingly, we formulate the hypotheses below. 
H2a – The effect of BGD on ENP is more positive for firms listed in the emerging markets. 
H2b - The effect of BGD on SOP is more positive for firms listed in the emerging markets. 
H2c - The effect of BGD on CSP is more positive for firms listed in the emerging markets. 
Additionally, corporations face institutional pressures at the industry level. While firms in the 
same industry face similar environmental and social challenges, the level of environmental and 
social challenges is more prominent in certain industries (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009). For 
instance, oil and gas companies are subject to a high monitoring from activist groups, tight laws 
and regulations (Liao et al., 2014) and may exhibit a higher CSR reporting (Khan, 2016). Thus, to 
the extent that the environmental and social performance in those industries captures the 
outcomes of voluntary and explicit CSR initiatives to address the pressures from stakeholders, 
CSP in high environmental and social impact industries will reflect the nature of the industry 
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(Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009). However, Jacskon and Apostolakou (2010) state that “CSR 
may, thus, become an institutionalized feature of sectoral governance structures”. There is no 
particular reason to believe that female directors may bring better discussions and perspectives to 
the boardrooms in some industries than in the others. Therefore, the following hypotheses were 
developed. 
H3a - Irrespective of the industry a firm belongs to, BGD improves ENP. 
H3b - Irrespective of the industry a firm belongs to, BGD improves SOP. 
H3c - Irrespective of the industry a firm belongs to, BGD improves CSP. 
 
3. Research design 
Sample and data 
We construct our sample by combining and matching data from various databases. For the 
period from 2002 through 2013, we first collect environmental, social and governance data 
(ESG) of firms in Europe from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 (ASSET4) available through 
DataStream. ESG data from ASSET4 is most commonly used by investment professionals with 
assets under management in excess of €2.5 trillion (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). ASSET4 
employs trained research analysts who collect 900 evaluation points per firm from publicly 
available sources such as the stock exchange filings, CSR and annual reports, and non-
governmental organizations’ websites. The analysts access CSR information on all listed firms 
irrespective of its degree of detail or firms’ marketing strategies, thus minimizing sample selection 
bias. 
After collecting the evaluation points across countries with varying reporting standards, the 
analysts transform them into consistent units to allow for quantitative analyses of the qualitative 
data. Subsequently, an equal-weighted framework is used to convert the evaluation points into 
250 key performance indicators, which are then further organized into 18 categories within 4 
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dimensions: (1) corporate governance performance, (2) economic performance, (3) 
environmental performance, and (4) social performance.  
Second, we collect financial and accounting data from DataStream and Worldscope, respectively. 
To be included in the sample, a firm must be a non-financial firm, and has annual financial, 
accounting and board data as well as the CSR data available. While the initial dataset consisted of 
754 firms, the application of the criteria reduced the number of firms to 589. Additionally, our 
panel data is not balanced; the number of firms with available CSR scores data increases over the 
years. 
Our CSP variables are: 
ENP: performance score on environmental dimension. It measures a firm's impact on 
living and non-living natural systems, including the air, land, and water, as 
well as complete ecosystems; 
SOP: performance score on social dimension. It measures a firm's capacity to generate 
trust and loyalty with its workforce, customers and society, through its use 
of best management practices; 
CSP3: the arithmetic average of the environmental and social scores. 
Independent variables 
Our variable of interest, BGD, is measured as the percentage of female directors on the board, 
gender. Based on social impact theory, Westphal and Milton (2000) argue that diversity on the 
board can lower social cohesion through creation of social barriers, which in turn reduces the 
probability that minority viewpoints will make an impact on the board’s decisions. Liu et al. 
(2014) find evidence that when it concerns financial performance, majority representation 
appears to have failed to hear the voices of minority representation. To investigate if the 
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proportion of female representation matters, we construct an indicator variable, dgender, which 
takes on the value 1 if a board has at least one female director and 0 otherwise. 
Furthermore, indicator variables are constructed to explore the industry and country effects. To 
investigate the industry effect, we construct, following Jackson and Apostolakou (2010), an 
indicator variable, dindustry, which takes on the value 1 if a corporation belongs to Basic Materials, 
Oil and Gas, and Utilities, industries that have high impacts on stakeholders and 0 otherwise 
(Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Healthcare, Industrials, Technology, and 
Telecommunications).4 The country effect is explored through the indicator variable, demer, that 
takes on the value 1 if a firm is listed in an emerging market and 0 otherwise.5 
Control variables 
Previous studies have shown that BGD can act as a substitute for board governance (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011). Accordingly, we include two governance variables. First, board 
independence, independence, measured by the percentage of strictly independent board members is 
included in our analyses. A director is strictly independent if he/she is not employed by the 
company, not representing or employed by a majority shareholder, not served on the board for 
more than ten years, not a reference shareholder with more than 5% of holdings, without cross-
board membership or recent/immediate family ties to the corporation, and has not accepted any 
compensation other than compensation for board service. Second, duality of the roles between 
the board chairman and the CEO, duality, is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is 
simultaneously the board chairman and 0 otherwise. 
Besides, firms with high growth or high leverage are more likely to be analyzed by providers of 
external finance, such as creditors, who may exercise pressure to reduce the resources allocated to 
pursuing CSR (Clarkson et al., 2008). Thus, we include two additional control variables to account 
for firm growth, growth, as measured by the price to book value of firm equity and leverage, 
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leverage, as measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets. Furthermore, Humphrey et al. (2012) 
find that firm profitability can affect the level of resources available to finance CSR activities. 
Thus, in our regression models we include profitability as measured by the return on assets, i.e. the 
ratio of earnings before interest expense and income taxes to total assets. Previous CSR research 
has consistently shown that CSP is influenced by firm size (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Borghesi et al., 
2014). Hence, we include firm size, size, measured as the natural logarithm of market value of 
equity. 
Finally, we control for time effects by including dtime, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the year is 
in the period 2008-13 and 0 otherwise. 
Model 
We estimate the panel data using the model below. 
 (1) 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is our dependent variable for firm i at time t, 𝑿𝑿it is a vector of covariates, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  indicates 
an unobservable time-constant firm effect, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an idiosyncratic error term, and β is a vector of 
coefficients to be estimated. To measure the effect of covariates on different scores, we regress 
each score (ENP, SOP or CSP) on the covariates. We make no a priori assumption about the 
strict exogeneity of the covariates and estimate equation (1) using several panel estimates, 
particularly Pooled OLS (P-OLS), Random Effects GLS (RE-GLS) and Fixed Effects OLS (FE-
OLS) estimations. From the estimations, we find that there is firm level heterogeneity in the CSP 
scores as indicated by the significant F-tests on firm fixed effect estimators and the Breusch–
Pagan tests while the Hausman test6 favors the FE-OLS estimator over the RE-GLS estimator. 
In light of this, we chose the FE estimator with robust standard errors, in all of the panel data 
models (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
 
1, , ; 1, ,it it it ity v u i N t T′= + + = =x β  
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4. Empirical results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports breakdown of the performance measures by year, industry and country. In 
particular, Panel A displays the evolution of the average ENP and SOP scores as well as the CSP 
score and gender during the sample period. CSP exhibits an upward trend over the period; so do 
the ENP and SOP scores and gender. The increase in the average CSP score from 6.35 in 2002 to 
7.15 in 2013 shows that firms on average have improved CSP during the sample period. During 
the same period, BGD has increased from 5% in 2002 to 18.5% in 2013. The increase of BGD is 
likely a result of the significant effort of European countries to improve gender diversity in the 
corporate workforce. Panel B shows the distribution of CSP scores and BGD scores by industry. 
Telecommunications sector exhibits the most gender diverse board while Utilities sector exhibits 
the highest level of CSP. Panel C exhibits the distribution of the level of CSP scores and BGD 
across Europe. France, Finland and Hungary exhibit high level of environmental scores, while 
the Netherlands, France and Hungary exhibit high level of social scores. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Univariate and bivariate analysis 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the sub-groups after dividing the whole sample into two 
sub-groups based on whether at least one female director is present on the board. Mean 
difference test statistics reported on the last column show that firms with female director(s) 
present on the board have an average ENP, SOP and CSP higher than those with no female 
director on their corporate board by approximately 1.3 z-score points. Moreover, firms with 
female director(s) present on the board tend to have a higher number of independent directors. 
According to Adams and Ferreira (2009), firms with female director(s) tend to be larger than 
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those with no female director are. They also tend to be concentrated in the countries where a 
regulation towards BGD is in place. 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix between CSP scores, industry, country and governance 
variables.7 Firms that score high on ENP tend to score high on SOP, suggesting that firms that 
perform well on social front tend to perform well on environmental front too. 
 
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 here] 
 
Multivariate analysis 
Table 4 reports the estimation results from equation (1) using the FE-OLS estimator, chosen to 
account for firm specific heterogeneity. Inferences of the analyses in the previous section are 
generally confirmed here: the coefficient of gender in Panel A is positive and statistically significant 
across all performance measures. These coefficients suggest that an increase in female 
representation on a corporate board improves ENP, SOP and CSP. This finding is in line with 
the expectation from our hypotheses H1a, H1b and H1c. In Panel B of Table 4 variable dgender is 
significant in all models, indicating that the presence of at least one female director on the board 
improves environmental, social and overall performances. This emphasizes the peculiarity of CSR 
issues. Unlike in the case of firm financial performance, where the number of women directors in 
a group needs to reach a certain threshold level, the number of women directors does not need 
to reach the critical mass to promote CSP. With regard to our control variables, the results show 
that the higher the number of independent directors is, the higher the CSP (SOP) score is. This is 
in line with the findings in the literature that board independence is an affective governance tool 
to creating positive value for a company (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 2011). The lower 
the profitability or the larger the size is, the higher the CSP (ENP) score is. This last result 
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supports the findings by Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) who show that larger firms achieve 
higher levels of CSP as they are likely to receive greater scrutiny from the general public and 
government. Finally, the positive and significant time dummy (dtime) in Table 4 indicates that the 
ENP, SOP and CSP scores are higher during the period 2008-2013, suggesting that firms are 
more committed in CSR issues after the onset of the financial crisis. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Industry and country effects 
The FE estimator in Table 4 takes into account firm level heterogeneity by including firm level 
fixed effects; however, the model does not allow an estimation of the effect of any other time-
invariant variable such as the industry and country indicator variables (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Therefore, additional analyses are conducted to investigate the effects of industry and country on 
the relationship between BGD and CSP. First, we test if the effect of BGD on CSP is 
heterogeneous across industries and across countries through F-tests. Results reported in Panel A 
of Table 5 show that while the effect of BGD on CSP scores is not heterogeneous across 
industries, the same effect is strongly heterogeneous across countries. 
To examine the effect further we construct two additional variables: 1) genderdemer, the product of 
the variables gender and demer to test hypotheses H2a-c, and genderdindustry, the product of the variables 
gender and dindustry to test hypotheses H3a-c. Equation (1) is then re-estimated with the new variables 
as additional covariates. Panel B of Table 5 summarizes the results. First, the coefficient for 
genderdemer is positive and significant across all performance measures, indicating that the effect of 
gender diversity on ENP, SOP and CSP is stronger for firms in the emerging markets. This 
confirms our hypotheses H2a-c. Finally, the positive effect of gender on ENP, SOP and CSP still 
remains. Second, the coefficient of genderdindustry is insignificant across all performance measures 
suggesting that the effect of gender diversity on ENP, SOP and CSP of a firm does not depend 




[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
5. Robustness checks 
Endogeneity 
One potential concern with the results reported in Table 4 is endogeneity. The first possible 
source for endogeneity is omitted variable bias; however, the use of FE estimator has mitigated 
this issue (Carter et al., 2010). The second possible source of endogeneity is simultaneity in our 
variable of interest;8 in other words, a more socially responsible firm may be more likely to 
increase its BGD. In order to account for this potential issue, we use instrumental variable (IV)9 
approach, one of the most widely used approaches in addressing simultaneity (Boulouta, 2013). 
In this approach, variables that are relevant but exogenous to the model are used as instruments. 
In our case, an instrument is relevant if it is correlated with gender, i.e. the endogenous variable, 
conditional on the other covariates, while exogeneity requires that the instrument is not 
correlated with the error term in the explanatory equation (conditional on the other covariates), 
i.e. the instrument does not suffer from the same problem as the original independent variable 
(i.e gender). We use as instrument,10 dlaw, an indicator variable equal to 1 when a regulation 
towards BGD is in place in the country of the market where the firm is listed and 0 otherwise.11 
This variable allows us to consider not only the presence of a gender regulation but also the 
timing. In addition, this variable is highly correlated with our endogenous variables yet exogenous 
to the model. 
If the endogenous variables are only weakly correlated with the instruments, estimates from IV 
regression could be biased. Therefore, we first test for the suitability of our choice of instrument: 
Cragg-Donald Wald statistic and Kleibergen-Paaprk Wald F statistic are both greater than 10 at 
157.535 and 74.376, respectively. Thus, we do not accept the null hypothesis that our instrument 
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is weak. Table 6 reports results from the IV models. The results show that BGD has a positive 
effect on firm environmental and social performance. Therefore, even after controlling for the 
most prevalent sources of endogeneity, the effect of BGD remains as well as that of profitability, 
size and dtime. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Treatment effect estimations 
As the inclusion of female directors is to an extent voluntary in some part by the companies, 
there may be selection bias in our sample. We use propensity score matching (PSM) to compare 
the average CSP of firms that have at least one female director on the board (treatment group) to 
the average CSP of identical (“twin”) firms that have no female director on the board (control 
group). The control firms are selected based on covariates of firm characteristics ensuring that 
each firm in the control group has approximately equal probability of being in the treatment 
group. This process addresses the selection bias and endogeneity. We estimate the treatment 
effect for the presence of at least one female on the board by using the Nearest-Neighbor 
matching without replacement. Table 7 shows the PSM results from an unmatched estimator and 
an average treatment effect of the treated (ATT) estimator for each score. The treatment effect is 
positive and significant, indicating that CSP scores of firms with female director(s) present on the 
board are better than those of firms with no female director on the board. The PSM results from 
Table 7 confirm the finding in Table 4 that an increase in the gender diversity improves CSP. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
6. Discussions and conclusions 
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The effect BGD has on CSP is relatively understudied despite a European-wide effort to 
promote gender equality in the corporate boardroom. In this paper, we examine the effect BGD 
can have on firm environmental, social and overall performances. In line with the previous 
studies (Rao et al., 2012; Zhang, 2012), we find that BGD benefits the society as an increase in 
female representation on corporate boards leads to improvements in environmental, social and 
the aggregate performance of the firm. Therefore, creating equal opportunities for different 
gender in the corporate boards should result in an improvement in firm CSP. Unlike in the case 
of financial performance studied in the literature, we show that firms do not need to have a 
threshold number of female directors on board to bring about the improvements. 
On one side, we show that a positive relationship between BGD and CSP is prevalent across 
industries; in particular, we find that BGD improves CSP in both high impact industries such as 
Oil and Gas industry and low impact industries such as Technology industry. According to 
Jackson and Apostolakou (2010), sectors represent an important structural boundary within a 
wider institutional boundary at the country level. On the other side, we show that the BGD-CSP 
relation is more pronounced in emerging markets where the institutional pressure for a more 
explicit, proactive and strategic form of CSP is lax. In other words, in emerging countries such as 
Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Turkey BGD can be a substitute for the 
institutionalized pressure for a higher firm commitment in CSR issues. 
Moreover, we show that firms with a higher number of independent directors, less profitable 
firms and bigger firms are more involved with their stakeholders than other firms. At the end, 
after the financial crisis CSR seems to become a more significant issue for firms. 
Our findings have implications for regulators. One approach governments commonly undertake 
in order to create equal opportunities for both genders in the boardroom is through gender law. 
Our results suggest that gender law may not only promote equal opportunities but also socially 
responsible firms. Moreover, a gender law to include just one female director on the corporate 
boards can bring about improvements in firm CSP. Our results also highlight that a corporate 
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governance law to induce firms to increase the number of independent directors can bring the 
same improvement in terms of firm CSP. 
Representation of female directors on corporate boards implies a breakthrough in the established 
ways of thinking that females played a marginal role in terms of board representation. This is 
especially so in the countries where gender regulations do not exist. Therefore, it will be 
interesting to investigate the institutional context as well as the characteristics of female directors 
that bring about the positive effect of gender diversity in the emerging markets. Also of interest is 
to explore the effectiveness of various formulations of regulations that can promote a better CSP 
in firms, and not only in large firms, but also in small firms. 
 
                                                          
1 Only Boulouta (2013) addressed the issue of endogeneity in her study and found a positive relationship 
between BGD and CSP for US firms. 
2 The top five countries with the highest proportion of firms that are included in the FTSE4Good Global Index 
are: the UK (69.39%), Finland (57.14%), Denmark (56.25%), Germany (50%) and Italy (50%). 
3 In the absence of theoretical guidance on how best to construct the aggregate measure, we construct the CSP 
score in a similar manner as in Ioannou and Serafeim (2012). 
4 The industry classification derives from DataStream. 
5 The classifications are based on the FTSE market classification. 
6 Breusch-Pagan and Hausman test results are not reported to save space, but they are available upon request. 
7 The tetrachoric technique is used to estimate the correlation between two indicator variables. 
8 Simultaneity or reverse causality arises when the independent variables are a function of the dependent variable 
or expected values of the dependent variable. 
9 To calculate IV estimates we use two-stage least squares (2SLS) as computational method. 
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Table 1: Sample breakdown. 
Panel A 
Year ENP SOP CSP gender 
2002 6.3977 6.3021 6.3499 4.7936 
2003 6.4156 6.2850 6.3503 5.9069 
2004 6.2102 6.3416 6.2759 6.0650 
2005 6.0240 6.3215 6.1727 7.1223 
2006 6.0066 6.2831 6.1449 8.4076 
2007 6.1971 6.2882 6.2426 8.9329 
2008 6.4208 6.6252 6.5230 9.4393 
2009 6.6434 6.7609 6.7022 10.2700 
2010 6.7659 6.9460 6.8560 11.3636 
2011 6.6680 6.8650 6.7665 13.1216 
2012 6.8119 6.9682 6.8901 15.5693 
2013 7.0548 7.2381 7.1464 18.5337 
Panel B 
Industry ENP SOP CSP gender 
Basic Materials 7.1969 7.0267 7.1118 10.8861 
Consumer Goods 7.0856 6.7592 6.9224 11.0466 
Consumer Services 5.4840 6.1584 5.8212 12.1288 
Healthcare 5.7515 6.0684 5.9099 10.0643 
Industrials 6.7225 6.5418 6.6321 8.0182 
Oil and Gas 5.8463 6.6827 6.2645 10.9481 
Technology 5.7538 6.0650 5.9094 7.9476 
Telecommunications 7.1472 7.6940 7.4206 14.0970 
Utilities 7.9417 8.1510 8.0464 8.9945 
Panel C 
Country ENP SOP CSP gender 
Austria 6.9326 6.7956 6.8641 5.5264 
Belgium 6.1824 5.6219 5.9021 8.2606 
Czech Republic 4.7605 5.7994 5.2799 10.1200 
Denmark 6.0124 5.4875 5.7499 9.7643 
Finland 7.5403 6.9135 7.2269 19.2318 
France 7.7007 7.7982 7.7495 11.1969 
Germany 6.9000 6.7787 6.8394 7.4465 
Greece 4.8399 5.2473 5.0436 7.3025 
Hungary 7.4810 7.7807 7.6308 4.3458 
Ireland 3.6750 3.2460 3.4605 4.7801 
Italy 6.1169 6.7848 6.4509 3.4343 
Netherlands 7.2539 7.8096 7.5318 11.7273 
Norway 5.4623 5.7925 5.6274 29.2024 
Poland 3.7067 4.0728 3.8898 12.8726 
Portugal 7.0404 7.4121 7.2262 1.3443 
Spain 7.2553 7.5999 7.4276 7.1821 
Sweden 7.1256 6.9671 7.0464 21.4343 
Switzerland 6.0744 5.9724 6.0234 6.8003 
Turkey 5.3176 4.9908 5.1542 5.9644 
United Kingdom 6.0401 6.4541 6.2471 8.8736 
Table 1 reports breakdown of performance scores by year, industry and country. ENP (SOP) is the z-score of a firm relative to that of the universe of firms in the 
ASSET4 database along environmental (social) dimension. CSP is the arithmetic average of ENP and SOP. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics. 
 
Whole sample At least one female director No female director Difference 
Variables Observations Mean Median SD Mean Median SD T-test 
ENP 754 7.0130 8.1825 2.6338 5.6748 6.0325 2.9183 1.3382 *** 
SOP 754 7.1541 8.1775 2.5573 5.8614 6.1320 2.7749 1.2927 *** 
CSP 754 7.0835 8.0075 2.4277 5.7681 6.0230 2.6327 1.3154 *** 
gender (%) 754 17.0881 14.2900 9.6379 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 17.0881 *** 
independence (%) 589 51.0069 54.6700 28.3241 44.6612 45.6100 27.1155 6.3457 *** 
duality 754 0.2576 0.0000 0.4374 0.2108 0.0000 0.4080 0.0467 ** 
growth 746 2.4878 2.0600 1.4670 2.4990 2.0700 1.4479 -0.0112   
leverage (%) 751 37.8484 38.5150 19.3883 36.1356 37.3300 20.8007 1.7127   
profitability (%) 751 7.3060 6.5500 4.7981 7.2701 6.5900 4.7059 0.0359   
size 752 8.4129 8.4431 1.3743 7.7136 7.6487 1.2529 0.6994 *** 
    %     %     %   
dindustry 754 0.2237 0.0000 0.4168 0.2223 0.0000 0.4159 0.0097   
demer 754 0.0225 0.0000 0.1483 0.0214 0.0000 0.1446 0.0011   
dlaw 754 0.1509 0.0000 0.3580 0.0487 0.0000 0.2152 0.1022 *** 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on variables. The three performance variables are ENP (SOP), the z-score of a firm relative to that of the 
universe of firms in the ASSET4 database along environmental (social) dimension, and CSP, the arithmetic average of ENP and SOP. Governance 
variables include gender, the percentage of female directors on the board, independence, the percentage of strictly independent board members, and 
duality, an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 if the CEO is simultaneously the chairman and 0 otherwise. Firm level control variables 
include the price to book value of firm equity (growth), the ratio of debt to total assets (leverage), the return on assets (profitability), and the natural 
logarithm of firm market value of equity (size). Indicator variables include firms from industries that have high impacts on stakeholders (dindustry), 
firms from the emerging markets (demer) and firms from countries where gender law exists (dlaw). All firm level control variables are winzorised at 
1% and 99%. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Table 3: Correlation matrix. 
Variables ENP SOP CSP gender dindustry demer independence duality dlaw 
ENP 1.0000 
                
  
SOP 0.7466 *** 1.0000   
             
  
CSP 0.9370 *** 0.9320 *** 1.0000   
           
  
gender 0.1590 *** 0.1599 *** 0.1707 *** 1.0000   
         
  
dindustry 0.0811 *** 0.1071 *** 0.105 *** 0.0151 
 
1.0000   
       
  
demer -0.0868 *** -0.0906 *** -0.0949 *** -0.0160   0.0262 ** 1.0000   
     
  
independence 0.1791 *** 0.2068 *** 0.2068 *** 0.1158 *** 0.0065   -0.0800 *** 1.0000   
   
  
duality 0.0600 *** 0.0616 *** 0.0650 *** -0.0035   -0.0018   -0.0401 *** -0.1368 *** 1.0000       
dlaw 0.0811 *** 0.1021 *** 0.0978 *** 0.2565 *** 0.0296 *** -0.0789 *** -0.0432 ** 0.1457 *** 1.0000   






Table 4: Static panel model estimations. 
Panel A 
  
ENP SOP CSP 
Variables Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. 
constant 3.5918 0.7409 *** 3.0499 0.7162 *** 3.3208 0.6113 *** 
gender 0.0127 0.0060 ** 0.0116 0.0053 ** 0.0121 0.0048 ** 
independence 0.0028 0.0018   0.0038 0.0017 ** 0.0033 0.0015 ** 
duality 0.0429 0.1673   0.2842 0.1493 * 0.1635 0.1400   
growth -0.0576 0.0370   -0.0641 0.0374 * -0.0609 0.0294 ** 
leverage -0.0010 0.0046   0.0053 0.0037   0.0021 0.0035   
profitability -0.0237 0.0108 ** -0.0136 0.0106   -0.0187 0.0089 ** 
size 0.3054 0.0964 *** 0.3781 0.0925 *** 0.3417 0.0791 *** 
dtime 0.8402 0.0955 *** 0.5432 0.0934 *** 0.6980 0.0775 *** 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes     Yes     Yes     
Regression F/ χ2 15.99   *** 10.92   *** 18.58   *** 
R2 overall 0.1708     0.2208     0.2284     
Observations 2969     2969     2969     
Panel A of Table 4 reports the estimation results from FE-OLS estimator with firm specific heterogeneity. The variable of interest is gender that 
measures the percentage of female directors on the board. Inference is based on robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Panel B 
  ENP SOP CSP 
Variables Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. 
constant 3.6991 0.7422 *** 3.1350 0.7272 *** 3.4171 0.6172 *** 
dgender 0.4498 0.1118 *** 0.3858 0.1099 *** 0.4178 0.0926 *** 
independence 0.0028 0.0018   0.0038 0.0017 ** 0.0033 0.0015 ** 
duality 0.0551 0.1669   0.2959 0.1500 ** 0.1755 0.1402   
growth -0.0544 0.0361   -0.0617 0.0374   -0.0580 0.0289 ** 
leverage -0.0012 0.0046   0.0052 0.0037   0.0020 0.0035   
profitability -0.0232 0.0106 ** -0.0132 0.0105   -0.0182 0.0088 ** 
size 0.2742 0.0968 *** 0.3528 0.0947 *** 0.3135 0.0801 *** 
dtime 0.8324 0.0922 *** 0.5294 0.0905 *** 0.6809 0.0747 *** 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes     Yes     Yes     
Regression F/χ2 18.93   *** 11.92   *** 20.02   *** 
R2 overall 0.1881     0.2330     0.2429     
Observations 2969     2969     2969     
Panel B of Table 4 reports the estimation results from FE-OLS estimator with firm specific heterogeneity. The variable of interest is dgender, a 
variable equal to 1 if there is at least a female on the board and  0 otherwise. Inference is based on robust standard errors. *, **, *** denote 






Table 5: Industry and country effects 
Panel A 
 
ENP SOP CSP 
gender (F-test industry effect) 1.46   1.45   1.78 * 
gender (F-test country effect) 70.19 *** 42.59 *** 67.54 *** 
Panel A of Table 5 reports results from F-tests on the presence of industry and country effects in the relationship between gender and ENP, SOP 
or CSP  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Panel B 
  ENP SOP CSP 
Variables Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. 
constant 3.5525 0.7418 *** 3.0365 0.7157 *** 3.2945 0.6117 *** 
gender 0.0161 0.0067 ** 0.0127 0.0058 ** 0.0144 0.0053 *** 
genderdindustry -0.0197 0.0124   -0.0066 0.0137   -0.0131 0.0116   
genderdemer 0.0859 0.0271 *** 0.0306 0.0162 * 0.0582 0.0209 *** 
independence 0.0028 0.0018   0.0038 0.0017 ** 0.0033 0.0015 ** 
duality 0.0553 0.1676   0.2884 0.1503 * 0.1718 0.1407   
growth -0.0596 0.0370   -0.0648 0.0374 * -0.0622 0.0295 ** 
leverage -0.0013 0.0046   0.0052 0.0037   0.0020 0.0035   
profitability -0.0242 0.0108 ** -0.0138 0.0106   -0.0190 0.0090 ** 
size 0.3127 0.0967 *** 0.3805 0.0923 *** 0.3466 0.0791 *** 
dtime 0.8486 0.0959 *** 0.5418 0.0933 *** 0.6952 0.0772 *** 
Firm Fixed Effects                   
Regression F/ χ2 15.91   *** 15.44   *** 9.51   *** 
R2 overall 0.2332     0.1709     0.2199     
Observations 2969     2969     2969     
Panel B of Table 5 summarizes the results from re-estimation of FE-OLS with the interactive variables genderdindustry and genderdemer. Inference is 






Table 6: Instrumental variable estimations. 
  ENP SOP CSP 
Variables Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. Coeff. Std.Err. Sign. 
constant - -   - -   - -   
gender 0.0501 0.0228 ** 0.0377 0.0187 ** 0.0439 0.0187 ** 
independence 0.0018 0.0019   0.0031 0.0018 * 0.0024 0.0016   
duality -0.0194 0.1741   0.2407 0.1544   0.1106 0.1456   
growth -0.0439 0.0391   -0.0546 0.0378   -0.0493 0.0311   
leverage -0.0013 0.0047   0.0051 0.0038   0.0019 0.0036   
profitability -0.0232 0.0110 ** -0.0133 0.0106   -0.0182 0.0091 ** 
size 0.2276 0.1192 * 0.3238 0.1067 *** 0.2757 0.0981 *** 
dtime 0.6575 0.1422 *** 0.4069 0.1402 *** 0.5322 0.1201 *** 
Regression F/χ2 16.44   *** 11.27   *** 18.08   *** 
Endogeneity test 2.9990   * 1.9960     3.1790   * 
Observations 2905     2905     2905     
Table 6 reports the results for the estimation using dlaw (dummy variable  equal to 1 when a regulation towards BGD is in place in the country of 
the market where the firm is listed and 0 otherwise) as the instrumental variable to account for the potential issue of simultaneity. Inference is 





Table 7: Treatment effect estimations. 
 
Treated  Controls Difference Sign. S.E. t-stat. 
a) ENP              
Umatched 7.0848 5.4901 1.5947 *** 0.1009 15.81 
ATT 7.0848 6.4819 0.6029 *** 0.2027 2.97 
b) SOP              
Umatched 7.2726 5.7371 1.5355 *** 0.0963 15.94 
ATT 7.2726 6.7780 0.4946 *** 0.1907 2.59 
c) CSP              
Umatched 7.1787 5.6136 1.5651 *** 0.0913 17.15 
ATT 7.1787 6.6300 0.5488 *** 0.1826 3.01 
Table 7 reports treatment effect estimations where the treatment group represents the firms with at least one female director on the board. The 
control group for each firm in the treatment group is chosen using Nearest Neighbor matching algorithm written by Leuven and Sianesi in 
STATA. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
